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COMPROMISE AGREEMENTS AFFECTING ESTATES
JAMES N. VAUGHANt
Ittrodction
Several statutes of New York deal with compromise agreements affect-
ing estates. Section 249-0 of the New York Tax Law, for example,
authorizes an executor to make an agreement with the Tax Commission
of New York State and the taxing authority of any other State com-
promising conflicting claims respecting the domicile of deceased. This
section, added by the Laws of 1941, is a sensible means for settling a
type of controversy apt to be expensive and quite capable of imposing a
double tax burden, state-wise, on the estate of a decedent whose domi-
cile is in issue.
Under Section 213 of the New York Surrogate's Court Act, the Sur-
rogate on application by an executor, administrator, temporary admin-
istrator, guardian or testamentary trustee, may authorize the compro-
mise of any debt, claim or demand which must be settled or liquidated
in the settlement of an estate. The purpose of this Section was con-
sidered in Matter of Leopold.' There a lawsuit begun in the lifetime of
deceased was pending undetermined at the date of his death. Two
persons qualified to act as his administrators. An opportunity to com-
promise the lawsuit was presented. One administrator wished to com-
promise. The other declined to do so. The administrator seeking the
compromise invoked Section 213 of the Surrogate's Court Act. The
Surrogate granted the application and approved the compromise. The
Appellate Division reversed,2 but on further appeal the Court of Ap-
peals' upheld the determination by the Surrogate. The court said the
purpose of Section 213 of the New York Surrogate's Court Act is to pro-
tect a fiduciary- against surcharge growing out of negligence or the exer-
cise of bad business judgment. It noted that every administrator has
full power over the entire estate under administration. In consequence
of this plenary power it is possible for a particular administrator to seek
approval of the compromise agreement which he desires to make and
for the court to direct that the compromise be accomplished notwith-
standing opposition by a co-administrator. An application for an order
pursuant to Section 213 of the New York Surrogate's Court Act may
be made on an ex parte basis unless the rule of a particular county
t Mlember of the New York Bar.
1. 259 N. Y. 274, 131 N. E. 570 (1932).
2. 233 App. Div. 412, 253 N. Y. Supp. 354 (1st Dep't 1931).
3. 259 N. Y. 274, 131 N. E. 570 (1932).
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requires that notice shall be given to estate beneficiaries. Nevertheless,
when the court makes its order approving a compromise under this
Section, all parties interested in the estate are foreclosed thereby, ex-
cept that any party on the final settlement of the estate may show that
the debt or claim was fraudulently compromised.
The most important compromise statute in the law affecting estates is
found in Section 19 of the New York Decedent Estate Law.4 This Sec-
tion provides the method for compromising any kind of dispute affect-
ing an estate including cases where the interests of infants, incompe-
tents, persons unknown or persons unborn are or may be affected by the
adjustment proposed. Although Section 19 has been part of the law
for many years, there is not a very substantial body of case law regard-
ing its meaning.
Content of Section 19, New York Decedent Estate Law
The Statute empowers the Supreme Court or the Surrogate's Court
having jurisdiction to authorize an executor, administrator or trustee
to compromise any controversy arising between different claimants to
the estate. The compromise takes the form of an agreement which must
be executed by all parties in being claiming an interest whose interests
are affected by the proposed agreement.' By a separate subdivision of
the Section provision is made for compromise agreements disposing of
any controversy arising before probate between persons claiming as
devisees or legatees on the one hand and persons claiming on a basis of
intestacy. In agreements before probate the necessary parties are
the nominated executors or petitioners for administration with the will
annexed together with all persons claiming as devisees or legatees and
all persons claiming by reason of intestacy. If, however, any person
in the classes mentioned (other than a nominated executor or petitioner
for letters c. t. a.) is unaffected by the proposed compromise he is not
a necessary party to the agreement.
To meet the problem of disability based on infancy or incompetency
the Section provides that persons so disabled shall be represented by a
special guardian who is to execute all proper instruments in the name
of his wards to carry into effect any compromise sanctioned by the
court. Similarly where it appears that the interests of persons unknown
or the future contingent interests of the unborn are or may be affected
by the compromise the court must appoint a suitable special guardian
to make and execute the necessary instruments to carry out the ap-
proved compromise agreement in their behalf. It is incumbent upon the
4. N. Y. DECEDENT ESTATE LAW § 19.
5. Matter of Wilson, 269 App. Div. 665, 53 N. Y. S. (2d) 14 (2d Dep't 1945).
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court itself to examine the proposed compromise agreement and to de-
cide whether it is just and reasonable in its effects upon the interests of
persons under disability and on the interests of unknown or unborn
persons. When the court determines that the proposed agreement is just
and is reasonable, its approval makes the agreement binding on the
persons under disability as well as on the interests of the unknown and
unborn who are parties in interest. When the agreement has been sub-
mitted to the court for approval the signatories have no right to with-
draw therefrom.'
Procedurally the application for approval of a compromise agreement
is simple. A verified petition must be made setting forth the provisions
of any instrument by virtue of which any claim is made to the estate
in controversy, together with all facts relating to the respective claim-
ants and the positions they have assumed. The petition must disclose the
possible contingent interests of the unborn and in general exhibit all
facts the court would require to make a reasoned determination of the
application. The court need not conduct any formal hearing but it must
examine all the facts and surrounding circumstances and then announce
its decision. In a case where the compromise agreement adjusts a pro-
bate contest it is customary to bring the application for approval of the
compromise agreement as an incident to the main probate proceeding.
Similarly it would be proper, in the adjustment of a controversy in an
accounting or any other type of proceeding, to entitle the application
for approval in the proceeding pending when the controversy arose.
Section 213 of the New York Surrogate's Court Act and Section 19
of the New York Decedent Estate Law Compared
Section 213 of the New York Surrogate's Court Act provides authori-
ty for a limited number of types of compromise following probate of a
will or the grant of letters of administration. It cannot be used in the
disposition of disputes arising prior to probate or issuance of such let-
ters. Section 19 on the other hand supplies the authority for adjust-
ing controversies originating immediately after the death of deceased
and going to the admissibility of his will to probate or the propriety of
the grant of letters of administration to the petitioner who seeks them.
It should be noted parenthetically that neither of these sections need be
invoked to compromise a dispute touching an estate where all parties in
interest are adult and competent and all agree by stipulation on the
disposition of a disputed question always provided of course that the
agreement is not void for considerations of public policy. Section 213
of the New York Surrogate's Court Act in contrast to Section 19 of the
6. 'Matter of Carstens, 272 N. Y. 662, 5 N. E. (2d) 382 (1936).
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New York Decedent Estate Law is characterized by informality and
by its ex parte character. Strict formalism and notice to all parties
feature the Decedent Estate Law provision.
The order made by the court under Section 213 of the New York
Surrogate's Court Act, owing to its ex parte character, lacks the quality
of definitiveness. An order under Section 19 of the New York Dece-
dent Estate Law is clearly of a more definitive character. By suppo-
sition, before the order under Section 19 is made every party in interest
without exception has become a signatory to a written agreement either
in person or by way of his special guardian.
Effect of Secrecy on a Compromise Agreement under Section 19
of the New York Decedent Estate Law
A compromise agreement under Section 19 of the New York Dece-
dent Estate Law probably would not be binding on any party executing
it on the erroneous assumption that the agreement expressed the whole
body of material understandings reached by all the parties to the agree-
ment relative to one another. This principle is not always easy of appli-
cation as is apparent from a comparison of Adams v. Outhouse7 and
Callaghan v. Corbin." In Adams v. Outhouse the deceased died intestate.
His estate was administered by his widow and one Lyon. One of the
distributees was Orrin Outhouse. When the administrators were pre-
pared to settle their accounts they applied to all distributees to agree
upon the accounts as submitted. A brother and sister of Orrin declined
to accept the accounts as proposed charging that Orrin in the lifetime
of deceased had appropriated personal assets belonging to the latter.
They claimed the administrators had a duty to compel Orrin to restore
the same. Apart from the complaining brother and sister there were
other distributees who knew nothing about this alleged misappropria-
tion and knew nothing about the objections which had been thus ex-
pressed. In this state of fact Orrin promised his brother and sister $150
each if they would consent to settlement of the accounts of the adminis-
trators as presented by the latter. The offer was accepted. The agree-
ment thus made-actually a form of compromise agreement-was con-
cealed from the other distributees. Thereafter the promisor refused to
make the $150 payments. The promisees sued. They were denied re-
covery. The Court said:
"These promises are within the principle which avoids all promises and
agreements by which one creditor, uniting in a composition deed, seeks
to secure an advantage over the other creditors agreeing to the compro-
7. 45 N. Y. 318 (1871).
8. 255 N. Y. 401, 175 N. E. 109 (1931).
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mise. Such arrangements and agreement, whatever their form, are uniformly
condemned...,,9
The agreement between Orrin, his brother and his sister might be called
a "side agreement" affecting the basic agreement which was made be-
tween all the distributees on the one hand and the administrators on the
other. This basic agreement was an understanding whereby the claims
of the administrators to have fully administered the property of de-
ceased were accepted as true by all parties beneficially interested in the
estate. The supervening side agreement was pronounced unenforceable
by the Court of Appeals on the theory that each of the distributees had
a duty of full disclosure to all of the other distributees of all facts rele-
vant to the administration of the fund in which they had a common
interest.
In Callaghan v. Corbin," the deceased died survived by a widow,
mother, one brother and three sisters. His will placed his entire 800,000
estate in trust for the income benefit of his widow. It directed that upon
the death of the widow the remainder should be paid to the distributees
of deceased ascertained as of that time. A probate contest ensued. The
widow was not on speaking terms with two of the sisters of deceased.
She applied to the brother and sister with whom she was on speaking
terms for aid in obtaining the consent of the other two to a compromise
agreement disposing of the probate controversy. The widow in writing
promised that if such aid were given she would pay $7,500 for the ser-
vice. The service was rendered. The agreement of compromise de-
sired by the widow was made, presented to the court and approved.
Thereafter the widow refused to pay the $7,500 promised depending
for her justification upon the principle framed in Adams v. Outhouse."
She asserted that the secret promise on which the plaintiffs relied was
against public policy and good morals. On the authority of the Adams
v. Outhouse rule she was successful12 until she reached the Court of
Appeals. The Court of Appeals unanimously held that Adams v. Out-
house did not control.13 Specifically the court said that the Adants case
related to a compromise made in consideration of concealment of estate
assets. This amounted to a clear fraud on the distributees who knew
nothing about such concealment, while in the Callaghan case the agree-
ment, though likewise secret, did not lessen the interests of any parties
9. Adams v. Outhouse, 45 N. Y. 318, 322 (1371).
10. 136 Misc. 731, 240 N. Y. Supp. 426 (Sup. Ct. 1930).
11. 45 N. Y. 318 (1871).
12. Callaghan v. Corbin, 136 Misc. 731, 240 N. Y. Supp. 426 (Sup. Ct. 1930), a'd,
231 App. Div. 70S, 245 N. Y. Supp. 778 (1st Dep't 1930).
13. Callaghan v. Corbin, 255 N. Y. 401, 175 N. E. 109 (1931).
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in the estate because the $7,500 promised in payment for the services
was to come from the pocket of the widow. The court also held that
the interests of parties in an estate are in severalty and are not joint.
They distinguished such interests from the interests of creditors of a
common debtor who are entitled absolutely to treatment on a basis
of equality with one another. The court saw no reason why any par-
ticular party interested in an estate should be deemed under any obli-
gations of disclosure or otherwise to any other party interested therein.
In a recent case in New York County a probate contest eventuated
in a tentative compromise formula framed by the attorneys for the pro-
ponent and the attorneys for the contestants. The proponent wis one
among a considerable number of general legatees. In the formula of com-
promise a fund was to be set up for the contestants to which all legatees
were to make contributions in proportion to their respective interests
under the will. The attorneys for the proponent submitted this pro-
posal to all legatees. Every legatee approved with a single exception.
The dissenting legatee demanded that he be paid par. It was pointed
out that it was impossible to expect that his co-legatees, who would
willingly contribute on the understanding that all were contributing
alike, would consent that one of their number should have the benefits
of the compromise while suffering none of its disadvantages. The pro-
posal was then made by the dissenter that the legatee-contributor who
was promoting the compromise agreement in a special manner should
agree secretly to make up to the dissenter the amount of the contribu-
tion which the dissenter under the terms of the agreement would be
required to make in the first instance. Such secret inducement might
perhaps be permissible under the Callaghan case although it would
appear that under the higher standard announced in the Adams case
this side agreement if made should be condemned.
Whether a Signatory to an Agreement is Bound Where
Other Parties Do Not Sign
In the Estate of Nellie G. Taylor,4 an unreported case, settled in
New York County, it appeared that deceased in her lifetime had owned
a valuable mining property which she sold to one Smyth. The purchase
price was payable in substantial installments over a number of years.
Before the price had been fully paid Mrs. Taylor died. Smyth was one
of her executors and qualified as such. Finding the balance of purchase
price too burdensome in the light of the productivity of the mine he
looked for a means to reduce his burden. Under the will of Mrs. Taylor
her entire estate was distributable outright in equal shares to three par-
14. Surr. Ct. (N. Y. Co.), Index No. P. 716-1939.
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ties, one of whom was an infant. In these circumstances Mr. Smyth
and the two adult parties entered into a written agreement by the terms
of which a substantial reduction in the balance due on the purchase price
would be accomplished. As an incident to his accounting in the Surro-
gate's Court, Mr. Smyth submitted this agreement for approval by the
court substantially in conformity with the requirements of Section 19
of the New York Decedent Estate Law. A special guardian was ap-
pointed for the infant legatee. His investigation led him to reject the
compromise in so far as his ward's interest was concerned. At this
stage in the proceeding the question arising was whether a promise by
the executor-debtor to pay the infant's share in the purchase price at
par would release the adult legatees from the contract to which they
were parties. In other words, it was a question whether definitively
to bind the adults it was indispensable that the infant party should bind
himself to the provisions set forth in the contract. The question seems
to be determinable by principles of contract law. Whether the signature
of a party to a multi-party agreement is conditionally or unconditionally
binding as respects that party's interests is a matter of intention.1"
In the Taylor case it was not necessary to determine the question be-
cause the adult parties consented to discharge by the debtor-executor
of the whole amount of his obligation in so far as the interests of the
infant were concerned.
A Compromise Must Involve a Real Dispute
A compromise agreement is a matter of mutual concessions. It is a
rare case where claims put forward by parties may reasonably be
pronounced utterly worthless. Such cases, however, have recently oc-
curred. In Matter of Lachat' it appears that a woman 93 years of age
made a will in favor of the manager of the hotel where she resided. The
manager propounded this paper. The terms of an earlier will made
gifts almost entirely to various charities. To the probate of the hotel
manager's will objections were interposed by the charitable legatees
under the prior paper, by the Public Administrator of New York Coun-
ty, by the Alien Property Custodian and by the Attorney General of the
State of New York. The case went to trial. The proponent put in his
prima facie case. Thereafter the matter was adjourned for a substantial
period. In the interval of adjournment the charitable residuary lega-
tees under the earlier paper entered into an agreement with the pro-
ponent and sole beneficiary under the propounded instrument by the
terms of which the propounded instrument would be denied probate and
15. 3 WnXIsio1, CoNMrRAcTs (rev. ed. 1936) § S24.
16. 184 'Misc. 492, 52 N. Y. S. (2d) 445 (Surr. Ct. 1944).
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The Interest of the Deceased Himself as Fixed by Statute
Imposes Limits on What Can Be Compromised
The Wadsworth case indicates that for a compromise agreement
there must be something to compromise. The case shows that the agree-
ment may not take the form of a total disregard of testamentary inten-
tion. The court in that case reached its result on considerations of gen-
eral public policy. There is one particular rule of public policy more-
over which deserves special attention relative to its bearing on compro-
mise agreements. Reference is made to the consequences in this state of
the rule that certain trusts are indestructible.
In Matter of Caswell" the facts show that the deceased was domi-
ciled in New York State. He owned real estate in Florida. His will was
duly probated in New York. By its terms he placed in trust for the in-
come benefit of his widow the minimum amount required to prevent an
election by her under the terms of Section 18 of the New York Dece-
dent Estate Law. The widow was dissatisfied with this provision. She
therefore brought an action in the State of Florida to appropriate to her-
self the deceased's real estate in that jurisdiction. To do this she in-
voked some principle of the homestead law of that state.1" Faced with
difficult and expensive litigation with the widow, the executor of the
estate entered into a compromise agreement with her subject to ap-
proval by the court. By the terms of this agreement the widow in
consideration of a payment of $18,000 purported to surrender all rights
she had in the estate. A special guardian was appointed to represent
infant trust remaindermen. He made a calculation that an outright
payment of $18,000 to the widow would have the effect of increasing
the pecuniary rights of his wards. He therefore reported to the court
approval of the agreement and requested permission on his part to
execute it. All other parties in interest approved the agreement. This
case therefore presents a situation featured by a bona fide controversy
and a controversy having intrinsic merits on both sides. Nevertheless
the court was constrained to disapprove the agreement on the sole ground
that under Sections 103 of the New York Real Property Law and 15 of
the New York Personal Property Law the widow, as an income benefici-
ary of an indestructible testamentary trust, could not effectively alienate
her right to receive the income from such trust. If the agreement were ap-
proved, said the court, and the $18,000 paid to the widow, nothing
could thereafter prevent her from compelling the Trustee to reconstitute
18. 185 Misc. 599, 56 N. Y. S. (2d) 507 (Surr. Ct. 1944), aff'd, 269 App. Div. 809, 56
N. Y. S. (2d) 407 (4th Dep't 1945).
19. FLA. Coip. GN. LAWS (Supp. 1940) § 5507 (1), Fla. Acts 1933, c. 16103, § 33, as
amended, Acts 1939, c. 18999, § 1.
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the proponent would receive a sum of money amounting to approxi-
mately ten percent of the estate. To this agreement objection was made
by the Public Administrator, the Alien Property Custodian and the At-
torney General on the ground that the hotel manager's case for probate
was devoid of all merit; literally that his was a worthless case. The
Surrogate to whom the compromise agreement was proposed for ap-
proval refused such approval thereby necessarily holding that it was
neither just nor reasonable. Whether this agreement would have been
approved in the absence of opposition cannot be determined. It might
have been disapproved even in that situation. It must be remembered
that in compromise agreements, especially touching the probate of wills,
the dead man has rights which the courts will protect.
The rights of the deceased are well illustrated by the result in
Matter of Wadsworth.17 There the testatrix by a simple will, in sub-
stance cut off most of her brothers and sisters. The bulk of her estate
she gave to a charitable use, specifically to Near East Relief work. To
the probate of this will the disinherited brothers and sisters objected.
All parties in interest, including the charity entitled to the residue, en-
tered into a written agreement under the terms of which the brothers
and sisters were made legatees and by the provisions of which the
money reserved to the charity would be expended elsewhere than at
the place and for the purpose specified by the testatrix. An applica-
tion for approval of this agreement was made to the Surrogate having
jurisdiction. His opinion recites that he was compelled to find on the
facts that this will had been properly executed; that the testatrix at
the time of its execution was in all respects competent to make a will:
and that when she executed this will she was subject to no restraints.
He therefore disapproved the proposed compromise agreement. He in-
vestigated the underlying necessities for a compromise agreement and
stated that every such agreement contemplates as a background a bona
fide and meritorious controversy. He noted that a deceased person has
rights which the court will protect. One such right is to have his will
probated as he wrote it when there is due execution, no serious doubt
as to his testamentary capacity and the absence of all traces of fraud
and undue influence.
Between the Lachat and Wadswortlh cases a notable difference is that
there was an active objective controversy in the first case while there
was none in the second. Hence from the Lacdat case it is apparent that
there must be not only a bona fide controversy but there must be some
merit to both sides of the disagreement.
17. 142 'Misc. 717, 256 N. Y. Supp. 343 (Surr. Ct. 1932'), alrd, 236 App. Div. 712, 25S
N. Y. Supp. 9S2 (4th Dep't 1932).
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the trust and to pay to her its income. To the same effect see Matter
of Mayer.20
The holding in the Caswell and Mayer cases should be distinguished
from the rule announced by the Court of Appeals in Fisher v. Fisher.2'
There an action was brought to compel specific performance of a com-
promise agreement. The defense was that the agreement was void in its
inception because by its terms it destroyed utterly the future contin-
gent interests in a testamentary trust of parties unborn at the time the
agreement was made. The deceased there by his will had created in-
destructible trusts. Objections to the probate of this will were filed and
a genuine controversy arose. A compromise agreement answering to all
the requirements of Section 19 of the New York Decedent Estate Law
was reached and was approved by the court having jurisdiction. By the
terms of this agreement a total destruction of the trusts contained in
the will was accomplished. The destruction of the trusts was not found
by the Court of Appeals to have been improper. The Fisher case since
the time of its announcement has been deemed authority for the prin-
ciple that whereas trusts of an indestructible kind cannot be destroyed
by a compromise agreement made after the probate of the will, such
trusts may be destroyed by an agreement executed and approved prior
to such probate. The reason is that until a will is probated any trust
created by it is not known to be valid. Once a will has been probated,
however, the validity of the trust is established. At that point the policy
supervenes and makes destruction of the trust wholly or pro tanto im-
possible of accomplishment.
As is the case with all general principles, instances may arise where
their application is supposed by a court to work such hardship that to
avoid it, the court may be led to display considerable ingenuity. M1at-
ter of Wade22 furnishes an illustration for this observation. There the
deceased by his will gave $500,000 to his trustee for the income benefit
of the widow. The residuary estate of the deceased was committed to
separate and distinct trusts for the respective lives of his three children.
The widow and the trustee were the executors of deceased. The widow
was not a trustee. In the administration of the estate by the executors
heavy losses were suffered. When the accounts of the executors were
presented the beneficiaries of the residuary trusts filed objections. Even-
tually a compromise agreement disposing of the objections was made. To
this agreement the widow as executrix and in her individual capacity
was a party. The sole trustee was likewise a party as such. It was pro-
20. -261 App. Div. 982, 27 N. Y. S. (2d) 433 (2d Dep't 1941).
21. 253 N. Y. 260, 170 N. E. 912 (1930).
22. 270 App. Div. 712, 61 N. Y. S. (2d) 16 (4th Dep't 1946).
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vided by the agreement that whereas the will directed payment to the
trustee of $500,000 with which to set up the widow's trust, such fund
should be "reduced" to $400,000. The compromise agreement in this
form was approved and the trust in the year 1937 was set up in the
amount of $400,000. An intermediate account was filed by the trustee
in 1942. The widow together with a special guardian representing infant
contingent remaindermen objected to the account. The objections of
the widow were (a) to the non-report of the missing $100,000 and (b)
to the non-report of income thereon for the period from the inception of
the trust to the closing date of the account. The trial court overruled
the objections holding that the compromise agreement was valid. To
the objection that the widow could repudiate the agreemente owing to
the public policy embodied in Section 103 of the New York Real Prop-
erty Law and Section 15 of the New York Personal Property Law the
trial court answered that the legal effect of the widow's act amounted
to a "renunciation" of her right to receive income on $100,000 in trust.
The trial court conceded that the trust fund had been reduced.
On appeal the Appellate Division disagreed with the reasoning of the
Trial Court but approved its result. This it accomplished by holding
that no reduction of the trust actually occurred? The court said that
if the trust had been set up (as, according to the court, it should have
been set up) one year after the testator's death in 1930 its value six
years thereafter (i.e. in 1937), at which time it was actually set up in
the sum of $400,000, would not have been in excess of $400,000. Con-
sequently the Appellate Division declared the use of the term "reduc-
tion" in the compromise agreement was in the nature of an unfortunate
misnomer. Moreover, the Appellate Division seems to have held that
the approval of the compromise agreement in the first instance by the
Surrogate's Court having jurisdiction carried with it by necessary im-
plication the conclusion that the Surrogate gave his approval only after
a full investigation of all the facts and circumstances plus the relevant
law. Indulging in this hypothesis the Appellate Division said that the
approved compromise agreement was the manifest equivalent of a find-
ing in 1937 that $400,000, when the trust was then set up, was the
equivalent of $500,000 within the meaning of the terms of the will. This
matter reached the Court of Appeals on a motion for leave to appeal
and in that court it was unanimously affirmed." The decision in the
Court of Appeals involved recognition for the first time that the Com-
23. Matter of Wentworth, 230 N. Y. 176, 129 N. E. 646 (1920).
24. See note 22 supra.
25. Motion for leave to appeal granted, May 22. 1946, 270 App. Div. 932, 62 N. Y. S.
(2d) 850 (4th Dep't 1946), aff'd, 296 N. Y. 244, - IN. E. (2d) - (1947).
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promise Agreement was made in violation of Section 15 of the Per-
sonal Property Law and Section 103 of the Real Property Law. Never-
theless that court held the Surrogate's decree of January 14, 1937,
approving the agreement, a conclusive adjudication of its validity. This
result in the Court of Appeals should be read against a background
of the language used in Matter of Wentworth.2"
Jurisdictional Limitations on Surrogates' Courts as Aflecting
Compromise Agreements
Is it possible for a compromise agreement in the Surrogate's Court
to make effective disposition of matters normally outside the jurisdic-
tion of that court? In Matter of Kraetzer," a compromise agreement
was presented for approval adjusting all controversies which had arisen
among multiple parties with regard to the disposition of trust remain-
ders some of which were testamentary while others existed under deeds
inter vivos. Apparently to decide on the justice and reasonableness of
the compromise the Surrogate would have found it necessary to con-
strue all the instruments involved. The Surrogate held that since he
lacked jurisdiction to construe an inter vivos instrument, he likewise
lacked the power to approve the compromise agreement in the form in
which it had been presented to him.
In Matter of Bausch2 7 it appears that a compromise agreement ad-
justing a probate controversy in effect placed the deceased's entire
estate in a trust the form of which in substance made it an inter vivos
trust. Years later it became necessary for the trustee to render its ac-
counts. Some doubt arose in the trustee's mind as to the jurisdiction of
the Surrogate's Court to take and state its account. It is apparent from
the provisions of the New York Surrogate's Court Act 28 that the Sur-
rogate's Court has-no jurisdiction over an inter vivos trust. The trust in
question had all the earmarks of a living trust though it came into
being by way of a compromise agreement in the Surrogate's Court.
Special Term held that the Surrogate's Court lacked jurisdiction. 0 The
Appellate Division reversed. 30 There was implicit in the compromise
agreement, according to the Appellate Division, the idea that some day
the Trustee would be required to account in order to gain a final dis-
charge. The court held jurisdiction was not lost by the Surrogate's
Court but fastened on this fund until the termination of the trust.
26. 230 N. Y. 176, 129 N. E. 646 (1920).
26a. 147 Misc. 609, 264 N. Y. Supp. 443 (Surr. Ct. 1933).
27. 270 App. Div. 418, 59 N. Y. S. (2d) 485 (4th Dep't 1946).
28. N. Y. STJRR. CT. Act § 171.
29. Order of Sup. Ct. (Onondago Co.) (Spec. Term, Cross, J.) entered May 14, 1945.
30. See note 27 supra.
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In Matter of Jasie,31 an unreported decision in New York County,
the inter-connections between matters coming immediately under the
jurisdiction of the Surrogate's Court and matters not pertaining to such
jurisdiction is well illustrated with reference to compromise agreements.
There the surviving spouse of the deceased was presented by pro-
visions under the will of his wife which he believed were inadequate as
tested by Section 18 of the New York Decedent Estate Law. Moreover
he was prepared to litigate the question whether the estate consisted
merely of the assets acknowledged by the executors to belong to it or
included additional property of substantial value. The surviving spouse
at the same time was plaintiff in an action pending in the Supreme
Court, the defendants of which were the executors in their individual
capacity and corporations, the stocks of which were owned by such
executors either individually or as fiduciaries. The surviving spouse was
a defendant in a separate replevin action but the subject matter of the
action was physically held by the executors who claimed it belonged to
the estate of deceased. In addition the surviving spouse was an indem-
nitor in relation to an obligation on which the primary obligor was the
deceased spouse. All parties agreed that it would be desirable to arrive
at a fixed amount of money by way of which to settle all the claims of
the surviving spouse and to detach him and his interests wholly from
the tangled property relations of the deceased spouse, her children, cer-
tain close corporations and her fiduciaries. A suitable agreement was
contrived. The question was whether such agreement came within the
jurisdiction of the Surrogate's Court having jurisdiction of the estate of
the deceased spouse. The court in substance held that it had power to
approve the agreement which provided for payment from the estate of
a substantial sum of money. The court took this action after it had
determined that the agreement, tested solely by the interests of the es-
tate itself, would operate beneficially with reference to all parties con-
cerned in the estate. The mere fact that this approval had ramifications
beyond the jurisdiction of the Surrogate's Court was considered to be
immaterial.
It is submitted that the decision in Matter of Kraetzcr 2 is not sound.
The Surrogate's Court is to be sure a court of limited jurisdiction. For
example, it has no authority directly to decide questions such as lia-
bility for breach of contract. Suit cannot be brought there directly on
a promissory note. The court cannot entertain an application to settle
the accounts of a trustee of a trust inter vivos. Its jurisdiction in short
almost wholly springs from an estate. Once the court has jurisdiction,
31. Surr. Ct. (N. Y. Co.), Index No. P. 6,3-1945.
32. 147 Misc. 609, 264 N. Y. Supp. 443 (Surr. Ct. 1933).
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however, any issues determinable by principles of law or equity whether
they involve contracts, debtor-creditor relationships or any other cate-
gory of relationships may be decided by that court as an incident to the
proper discharge of the business over which it has direct jurisdiction.
If, as in the Kraetzer case, the approval of a compromise agreement
directly affecting the fortunes of an estate calls for a determination of
the meaning of a trust deed inter vivos no reason appears why the
court should not supply such construction. The court is engaged in such
activity not by way of tampering with inter vivos trusts but is engaged,
as in the Jasie case, with the problem of the proper administration of
the affairs of a deceased person.
The Range of Compromise Agreements
If it be supposed that there is something to compromise, that there
is a genuine controversy and that there is no flagrant disregard either
of public policy or the requirements of good faith, it is believed that
there is no limitation on what may be accomplished through the medium
of a compromise agreement approved under the provisions of Section
19 of the New York Decedent Estate Law.
To illustrate the extent to which a compromise agreement may go
consideration may be given to what was done in the Estate of Emma H.
Rose,3 3 an unreported case in New York County. There deceased,
dying in 1944, left what purported to be her last will and testament
dated in August of that year. She had also executed testamentary in-
struments in 1943 and in 1942. Under the 1944 paper she had
wholly eliminated two persons named in the earlier papers to receive
substantial legacies. She had also changed her executors and trustees
to persons unmentioned in the earlier papers. In the 1944 paper she set
up a single trust. That paper contained an in terrorem clause. It also
contained provisions endowing her nominated executors and trustees
with unusual powers. For example, they were authorized to abandon
her property if they chose to do so. They might carry estate property
in their individual names with no mark of trusteeship attached thereto.
Many administrative powers were given to be exercised in the "abso-
lute and uncontrolled discretion" of the nominated fiduciaries. Express
power was given to hold the estate in cash for any length of time what-
ever regardless of whether any interest was earned thereon. The judg-
ment of the nominated executors and trustees was made final and con-
clusive in making any division or distribution of the estate both as to
the value and as to the kind of property to be divided or distributed.
Objections to this paper were filed by the legatees under the earlier
33. Surr. Ct. (N. Y. Co.), Index No P. 91-1945.
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wills. The litigation was prolonged. The controversy eventually was
compromised by way of an agreement to which all parties in interest
were signatories.
By way of the compromise agreement a legatee charged with undue
influence in the procurement of the propounded paper had his legacy
reduced by fifty percent. This legatee, who was one of the nominated
executors and trustees under the propounded paper, was wholly elimi-
nated from the office of fiduciary. Two persons named to act as execu-
tors and trustees under the terms of earlier papers were made by the
compromise agreement executors and trustees under the will as pro-
bated, though that paper in its original made no mention of them.
These same parties, named as legatees in the earlier papers, were added
as legatees to the terms of the propounded paper in the form in which
it was probated. The unusual powers mentioned above were removed
because the compromise agreement provided that they should be deleted
from the propounded paper. It was likewise required by the compromise
agreement that the in terrorem clause should be deleted. Many other
changes were accomplished and the whole result achieved the form of a
completely restated will, the text of which was the propounded paper
amended by way of additions to and subtractions from the text in im-
portant particulars. One further result of the compromise agreement
consisted in the substitution of four simple trusts for one trust of ex-
ceptional complexity.
The compromise agreement in the Rose estate contained express con-
sents in advance by all parties that the will as compromised when
offered for probate in foreign jurisdictions would not be the subject
matter of opposition by any party to the agreement. On the contrary
all such parties by the terms of the agreement expressly waived notice
of any such probate proceeding and covenanted that they would make,
execute and deliver all further instruments necessary to aid in the ad-
mission of the will, as compromised, to probate in any other jurisdic-
tion. The agreement fixed the compensation of all attorneys who had
participated in the proceeding. It provided that the court having juris-
diction should retain jurisdiction of the entire proceeding pending com-
plete performance of the agreement. In the Rose case the complexities
of the problem related to the alterations to be made in the dispositive
and administrative scheme set forth in the will as originally propound-
ed. There were no particular difficulties relative to the parties neces-
sary on the agreement itself. Decided complications in this regard may
however arise.
Party complexities may be illustrated from the situation arising in
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the Estate of Charles H. Hastings34 who died a resident of New York
County and whose will was the subject of a contest. Mr. Hastings
gave his entire estate to charitable purposes cutting off entirely those
persons who would take in intestacy. His will if probated would op-
erate on real estate in a foreign jurisdiction. While the contest of his
will was pending one of the contestants died testate, domiciled in a for-
eign jurisdiction. That contestant's will was probated. It set up trusts
and named a trustee. Theoretically if Charles H. Hastings had died
intestate (something which was not known to be or not to be the fact
when the contestant died) title to his real estate on the facts stated would
have vested in part at least in the Trustee of the deceased contestant.
It was thought therefore that to secure an absolutely binding compro-
mise agreement which would pass muster when examined later by title
examiners of real estate, it would be necessary for the contestant's
trustee to secure ancillary authority in the State of New York so that
such trustee with ancillary power might become a signatory to the pro-
posed compromise agreement. A somewhat similar situation arose rela-
tive to a second contestant who during the pendency of the probate
contest became incompetent while domiciled in a foreign jurisdiction.
In the Hastings case the consideration for the surrender of the right
to object was simply a stated number of dollars but the situation of the
parties exacted a quite refined form of legal analysis so that the agree-
ment itself, as it turned out, proved fairly complicated.
There is currently pending in New York County a rather singular
problem connected with compromise agreements. 5 In this instance
deceased died testate according to the claims made by his nominated
executors. At the time of his death he had no known distributees.
Under such circumstances. the Surrogate's Court Act requires that cita-
tion issue to the Attorney General of, the State of New York3" and
to the Public Administrator of New York County." Finally a citation
on this state of fact must be published against unknown distributees
for whom on the return of the citation it is a matter of standard prac-
tice for the court to appoint a special guardian. Objections to the pro-
pounded paper were filed by the Public Administrator and bythe special
guardian. The Attorney General served and filed merely a notice of
appearance.
In due course negotiations were opened between the attorneys for
the proponent, the attorneys for the Public Administrator and the
34. Surr. Ct. (N. Y. Co.), Index No. P. 869-1942.
35. Estate of Isidor Liberman, Surr. Ct. (N. Y. Co.), Index, No. P. 570-1946,
36. N. Y. SURR. CT. ACT § 54
37. N. Y. SURR. CT. AcT § 136-2.
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special guardian. These negotiations resulted in a compromise agree-
ment by the terms of which, among other provisions, a sum of money
would be set up for the benefit of the distributees of the deceased pro-
vided such distributees appeared and proved their positions within two
years following the date of approval of the compromise agreement. If
at the expiration of the two year period no distributees answer the re-
quirement of the compromise agreement the provision is made that the
money shall be repaid to the parties benefited under the will who are
to contribute such money in the first instance.
On this state of the record an application entitled in the probate pro-
ceeding was made for approval of the agreement. This application was
on notice to all who had appeared. Every legatee and devisee was sig-
natory to it and all other parties had assented to it except the People
of the State of New York in their sovereign capacity who, it was sup-
posed, had no interest in the matter and would claim none. On the
return day of the motion for approval it turned out that the Attorney
General opposed approval on the theory that the People's "right" to
escheat was cut off by the provisions of the agreement. The idea under-
lying the position taken by the Attorney General seems to be this: If
the deceased died intestate for the reason that the instrument pro-
pounded as his will could not be probated owing to the incompetency
of deceased at the time the paper was executed or for some other
reason, then the fund in the first instance would belong to his dis-
tributees. Should it happen, however, that no distributees would appear
and prove status, then there would be a complete failure of title to the
property whereupon the principle of escheat would place the fund in
the coffers of the public.
It is believed that this is the first time in the history of the office
of the Attorney General that that functionary has taken such a posi-
tion; and yet it has some appearance of merit. A difficulty is that the
so called right of escheat does not appear to rise to the level of a title.
If the People in their sovereign capacity do not gain title under the
operation of the principle of escheat it may perhaps be doubted that
the Attorney General has standing to object while purporting to speak
solely for the People in their sovereign capacity. The function of the
Attorney General it may be is to speak only for the unknown distribu-
tees. If so, one has the curious situation of a special guardian willing
to adjust the matter while acting for such unknown distributees while
the Attorney General having the same clients declines to consent. It
is a question whether the Attorney General in such circumstances is a
supernumerary.
Enough has been said on the Liberman case to show that in corn-
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promise law as in all other law new facts bring about brand new ques-
tions as to legal rights and obligations.
A Note on Fees
Lawyers representing parties to the compromise agreement other than
the lawyers representing the estate fiduciary and other than special
guardians are not entitled to be paid from the general fund for their
services in connection with the compromise agreement. 88 Neverthe-
less there is nothing to prevent payment of compensation from the gen-
eral fund to all attorneys who have appeared and who have contributed
to the success of the agreement if provision therefor is made part of
the agreement itself.
38. Matter of Wadsworth, 250 App. Div. 11, 293 N. Y. Supp. 304 (1st Dep't 1937),
aff'd, 275 N. Y. 590, 11 N. E. (2d) 769 (1937).
